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U.S. AND E.U. SME SUBCONTRACTING POLICY AND PRACTICE 
TRENDS: TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC ACCOUNTABILITY CONSENSUS 
Max V. Kidalov* 
 
ABSTRACT. U.S. and E.U. public and defense procurement rules require large 
prime contractors to promote subcontracts to small businesses, a.k.a. small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs).  Under the U.S. Small Business Act, large 
firms encourage subcontracting through publicity, subcontracting plans, and 
“good faith” efforts to achieve subcontracting goals.  However, process-
oriented measures failed to guarantee definitive results.  In contrast, E.U. 
and member governments can hold large firms accountable to stricter 
subcontracting standards (often sweetened by incentives).  With the Small 
Business Jobs Act of 2010, the U.S. is trying accountability measures now.  
Therefore, large contractors must plan for definitive subcontracting 
commitments in both markets.         
INTRODUCTION 
Governments in both the United States and Europe have adopted 
laws, policies, and practices to encourage large firms to subcontract 
with small businesses, also known in Europe as small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs).  In general, subcontracting assistance measures 
can take one of two forms: (1) aspirational, process- and publicity-
oriented measures designed to make it easier for small firms to find 
out about subcontracting opportunities, and (2) accountability 
measures designed to make large prime contractors responsible for  
------------------------ 
* Max V. Kidalov, J.D., LL.M., is Assistant Professor of Procurement Law & 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA.  His teaching and 
research interests are in public and defense procurement, socioeconomic 
contracting, international procurement and defense trade, and contracting 
anti-corruption policies.  Nothing in this article necessarily reflects the views 




Copyright © 2013 by PrAcademics Press 
40 KIDALOV 
taking specific, meaningful steps that result in definitive subcontract 
awards. 
In this area, the European authorities have led the way in 
requiring meaningful subcontracting participation. The United States 
traditionally focused on measures to improve the subcontracting 
process or publicity.  However, these measures alone failed to assure 
meaningful increases and participation in small business 
subcontracts, innovation, and national or regional development.  The 
reasons for this failure are many and include excessive risk 
avoidance, the drive to lock in suppliers as early as possible, 
decreasing bargaining power of small firms, high transaction costs, 
and even bait-and-switch fraud by which large contractors include 
small firms in bids or proposals but fail to pass along any work once 
government contracts are awarded (Europe Economics, 2009a, pp.8-
15; Newell, 2009).  In terms of the principal-agent model enunciated 
by Christopher Yukins (2010) or the public choice framework invoked 
by Europe Economics (2010), mere monitoring of prime contractors’ 
subcontracting efforts has arguably failed to produce alignment with 
the public (and governmental) interests in small business firms to 
such an extent that strict measures to ensure greater bonding or 
alignment of the interests of prime contractors, government 
purchasing officials, and public policymakers are now required. As a 
result, a subcontracting policy consensus is emerging as authorities 
in both procurement systems are re-emphasizing definitive 
accountability measures (some of which are sweetened by incentives 
to large firms).  This has serious implications for make-or-buy 
decisions and supply chain management decisions of large 
government contractors, in particular, international contractors.       
EUROPEAN SME SUBCONTRACTING TRENDS 
The European Court of Justice Legal Framework on Subcontracting 
In Europe, the overall legal framework for SME subcontracting is 
supplied by the precedents of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
concerning socioeconomic subcontracting requirements.  In 
Gebroeders Beentjes BV v. Netherlands (1988), the ECJ approved the 
use of mandatory contract conditions and award criteria requiring the 
use of the long-term unemployed if these conditions and criteria were 
fully disclosed in advance in the solicitation and were not 
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discriminatory on the basis of nationality.   Two years later, in DuPont 
de Nemours Italiana Spa v. Unita Sanitaria Locale No. 2 Di Carrara 
(1990), the ECJ invalidated a requirement that a percentage of the 
products sold to the government be obtained from a domestic 
supplier.  In another two years, Commission v. Italy (1992), the ECJ 
invalidated a requirement that subcontractors be registered in a local 
region. The ECJ did not address the Gebroeders Beentjes ruling in the 
latter two cases, thus creating a seeming conflict. 
Eight years later, in Commission v. The French Republic (Nord-
Pas-de-Calais case; 2000), the ECJ had the opportunity to address 
SME subcontracting again.  That case concerned tender competitions 
for construction and maintenance of public school buildings.  The 
competition was subject to the following SME arrangement:  
On 10 February 1995, an agreement was signed between the 
President of the Commission PME-Marchés des Constructions 
Scolaires of the Fédération Régionale du Bâtiment, the 
President of the Fédération Régionale des Travaux Publics 
and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Delegate of the Syndicat 
National du Béton Armé et des Techniques Industrialisées in 
order to define the detailed arrangements according to which 
regional and local PME (Petites et Moyennes Entreprises; 
small and medium-sized firms), represented by the 
signatories, could tender for the global contract for the 
construction and maintenance of the secondary schools of 
the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region in the form of joint groupings 
of mutually supportive undertakings divided into three 
categories per contract notice published. (Commission v. The 
French Republic [Nord-Pas-de-Calais case], para.19, 2000).  
Thus, the tender notice specified an “additional criterion related 
to local employment” (Commission v. The French Republic [Nord-Pas-
de-Calais case], para.20, 2000), presumably, by means of utilizing 
local SMEs as members of bidders’ teams.  This was both a contract 
award criterion and a condition of contract performance.  Although 
the case does not describe the requirement in great detail and does 
not set a monetary performance target or goal, meaningful 
participation by local SMEs was clearly required.  Relying on 
Gebroeders Beentjes (1988), the ECJ held that a contract award to 
the most economically advantageous tenders “does not preclude all 
possibilities for the contracting authorities to use as a criterion a 
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condition linked to the campaign against unemployment provided 
that that condition is consistent with all the fundamental principles of 
Community law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination” 
(Commission v. The French Republic [Nord-Pas-de-Calais case], 
para.50, 2000). Further, the ECJ in the same case interpreted 
Gebroeders Beentjes (1988) to mean that such criteria are valid 
regardless of whether they are performance conditions or award 
criteria.    
Early E.U. Subcontracting Policies 
Historically, SME subcontracting assistance policy in government 
procurement appears to be a fairly recent area of emphasis for the 
European authorities.   The first major pronouncements on this issue 
from the European Commission (EC) appear to be its 1989 
Communication from the Commission: Development of 
Subcontracting in the Community and 1990 Communication to the 
Council: Promoting SME Participation in Public Procurement in the 
Community. In these documents, the EC emphasized its preference 
for binding mandatory subcontracting obligations on the part of large 
firms.  To that end, these two communications together stressed the 
following positions: first, subcontractor SMEs deserve legal certainty 
of participation on large government projects, especially if large non-
European firms will act as prime contractors; and, second, mandatory 
SME subcontracting requirements are much more preferable than 
mandatory SME prime contracting set-asides or preferences (EC, 
1989, 1990). 
In Development of Subcontracting (EC, 1989), the EC called for 
imposing mandatory subcontracting obligations on large prime 
contractors.  Specifically, the EC stated that it “considers that, for 
subcontracting in public procurement, action is required on two 
fronts: better information must be made available on subcontracting 
opportunities; [and] the legal status of subcontractors must be clearly 
defined” (p. 12, 1989). The EC cited with approval the practice of 
including the main contractor’s subcontracting intentions in a tender 
notice and called on public authorities to facilitate binding contractual 
agreements between SME subcontractors and large prime 
contractors prior to the latter’s tender submission.  The EC also noted 
that it viewed measures to promote SME participation in public 
contracts as antidotes to mere regional preferences in public 
contracts (1989).   
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In Promoting SME Participation (EC, 1990), the EC rejected SME-
favoring measures at the prime contracting level, such as 
reservations, set-asides, price evaluation preferences, and “indirect 
discrimination [that] could arise where SMEs predominate among the 
enterprises of a region or locality that is itself the subject of 
preference”  (1990, p. 4,). The main argument was a criticism of U.S.-
style small business prime contracting preferences and set-asides on 
grounds, such as administrative costs, economies of scale and other 
competitive benefits of large businesses, and alleged disincentives 
for modernization and productivity improvements.  The EC had argued 
that unspecified “certain preference regimes” at the prime 
contracting level, which were based on the U.S. Small Business Act 
model, were contrary to European Community law, as interpreted in 
the 1990 ECJ case, DuPont de Nemours Italiana Spa (1990, p. 4,).   
Ironically, DuPont de Nemours Italiana Spa (1990) was a case 
about subcontracting, not prime contracting.  As stated previously, 
the ECJ there invalidated a requirement that a percentage of the 
products sold to the government be obtained from a domestic 
supplier.  It would have been natural for the EC to interpret this case 
as prohibiting mandatory socio-economic subcontracting 
requirements.  The EC, however, did no such thing.  Instead, it 
construed this case to prohibit mandatory SME prime contracting 
preferences.  At the same time, the EC validated requirements for 
mandatory subcontracting.  Importantly, the EC’s 1990 communica-
tion noted that  
SMEs increasingly gain access to larger public contracts 
through sub-contracting . . . [and t]he public procurement 
directives leave Member States a wide freedom to pursue an 
active policy of encouraging local sub-contracting.  Following 
the logic of the decision of the Court of Justice in Case 31/87 
(Gebroeders Beentjes  v. the Netherlands) it is open to them 
to use contract conditions to promote sub-contracting, 
providing this is not done in a way which has the effect of 
discriminating against enterprises from other Member States 
(EC, 1990, p. 6.). 
In a sign of consistency, Promoting SME Participation (1990) 
reaffirmed the validity of the EC’s Development of Subcontracting 
communication (1989) and its emphasis on definitive subcontracting 
measures as a statement of EC policy.  In particular, the EC stated in 
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Promoting SME Participation that large contractors must be “required 
to indicate their subcontracting intentions in their offers” and that “[a] 
clear and balanced legal framework would make it easier to tender 
for sub-contracts in other Community countries” (EC, 1990 p. 7).  
Further, the EC called on public agencies to review their procurement 
procedures with particular focus on the legal “recognition” given to 
subcontractors by these agencies, as well as on process-oriented 
measures, such as prompt payment and related disputes 
mechanisms, and protection of subcontractors from terms more 
onerous than those imposed on primes.  The EC determined that 
these measures together would promote SME subcontracts.  
However, it seemed to place greater emphasis on process-oriented 
measures (EC, 1990). 
E.U. Subcontracting Policies under Recent Procurement Directives 
The EC further addressed subcontracting in the 2004/18/EC 
Public Procurement Directive (European Parliament and European 
Council [EP & EC], 2004), also known as the “Classic” Directive.  
However, the EC’s 2004 position on subcontracting appears very 
broad and vague.  Recitals 1 and 46, as well as Article 26 of this 
directive authorize the use of socio-economic considerations in 
contract awards and as contract performance conditions.  Further, 
Recital 32 expressly states that “in order to encourage the 
involvement of small and medium-sized undertakings in the public 
contracts procurement market, it is advisable to include provisions on 
subcontracting” (EP & EC, 2004).  
Some national authorities with major procurement budgets took 
their cue from the EC’s apparent policy preference and began to 
emphasize process-oriented measures.  For example, in 2004, the 
British Office of Government Commerce (U.K. Small Business Service 
and Office of Government Contracting [UK SBC & OGC], 2004) 
addressed subcontracting in its publication Tendering for 
Government Contracts: A Guide for Small Business.  The Guide 
emphasized publicity and transparency without addressing 
mandatory subcontracting:  
Many of the highest-value government contracts are let to 
large companies. However, small companies can still play a 
part in these contracts, perhaps as subcontractors or by 
forming consortia. There is no single way of finding out about 
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subcontracting opportunities, although OGC is encouraging 
large suppliers to government to make subcontracting 
opportunities available via their websites. Public-sector 
organizations may give you information about their main 
contractors or you might identify and contact a supplier who 
has won a major contract, for example through OJEU. In 
recent years Public Private Partnership (PPP) and Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts have become more popular. 
Although it may not be appropriate for small and new 
businesses to take on these high-value and long-term 
contracts, there are many opportunities for subcontracting 
and consultancy work. (UK SBS & OGC, 2004, p.5.)   
However, there is also a strong, growing European trend going 
beyond mere subcontracting process improvements and towards 
mandatory subcontracting set-asides.  For instance, the European 
Space Agency (ESA) (2010) uses the so-called C1 and C3 Clauses, 
which reserve certain subcontracts for non-prime contractors and 
SMEs.  Non-primes do not include the systems integrators who 
dominate the European aerospace industry, such as EADS and 
Alcatel-Alenia Space.  According to the ESA SME Policy Office (ESA, 
2010), the C1 Clause reserves subcontracting opportunities to 
“equipment suppliers and SMEs,” while the C3 Clause reserves these 
opportunities to “SMEs and Research Institutes.”  The ESA (2010) 
provides the following additional guidance, stating that 
“[p]rocurements where the C1 and C3 clauses are used include those 
for technology research activities and for the development of 
equipment, components, or instruments—where SMEs and their 
partners have the necessary expertise, and where favoring these 
entities would result in a more efficient use of funds.”  (ESA, 2010) 
The ESA (2010) also uses the C2 Clause for non-primes and 
SMEs, and the C4 Clause for SMEs on procurements over €250,000.  
These clauses request large primes to provide for adequate SME 
participation in terms of quality and quantity of subcontract awards, 
or to justify why it cannot be achieved (ESA, 2010). 
Definitive or mandatory subcontractor participation measures are 
also becoming increasingly popular in Europe at the national level.  
These measures generally fall under two categories: (1) quasi-
voluntary arrangements where large firms award definitive 
subcontracts to small firms for performance of R&D-intensive work on 
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condition of receiving government co-financing towards paying for 
such subcontract awards; and (2) subcontracting requirements to 
award a set percentage of subcontracts to small firms without co-
financing and regardless of whether the work if R&D-intensive 
(Europe Economics, 2009a, p. 16).  The latter measures might 
involve incentives other than co-financing.    
The SME Pact Model 
The most popular R&D-related SME subcontracting measure 
appears to be the SME Pact.  Started in France in 2004 by a trade 
association of high-tech SMEs, called Comité Richelieu, the SME Pact 
is an agreement between this trade association, the French State 
Innovation Agency (OSEO, the French version of the U.S. Small 
Business Administration, focused on innovative SMEs), and large 
private firms, large government-owned or government-controlled 
firms, and various government ministries.  Under a SME Pact, large 
businesses commit themselves to utilize small innovative firms as 
subcontractors and to track and monitor the SME share in 
procurement.  The SME trade association tracks projects and 
awarded subcontracts, and publicizes them through public annual 
reports.   The SME Pact regulates subcontracts on government 
civilian and defense projects, as well as on purely commercial 
projects.  The SME Pact assists companies that meet the E.U. 
definition of SME, which includes companies with up to 250 
employees and €50 million in revenue turnover.  In addition, the SME 
Pact assists SMEs under an “enlarged” definition of 1,000 or four 
times the number of employees under the E.U. definition, and €100 
million or twice the revenues under the E.U. definition.  As an added 
requirement, the SME firms must meet the “innovation criterion,” 
which specifies that 10% of the firm’s turnover must be dedicated to 
R&D (Jourdain, 2006, 2007, 2008).  
The SME Pact promotes subcontracting with SMEs as an answer 
to three problems that hinder SME participation in public 
procurement: poor access to information, risk assessment or proof of 
competency, and large contract size.  The SME Pact includes four 
initiatives to address these problems: the so-called MET, REX, 
Passerelle, and SMEwatch programs (Jourdain, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
Pact activities are evaluated to ensure that they result in definitive 
subcontracting obligations based on two program indicators: (1) the 
number of subcontracts awarded to SMEs after they participated in 
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MET Program activities, and (2) SME share in procurements of those 
large prime contractors that signed up for the SME Pact.  The MET 
and REX programs are designed to address the challenge of access 
to information. The MET Program is a structured communications 
program which enables SMEs to offer competitive-edge products or 
services to large primes, either directly as a finished product or 
service, or through collaborative R&D.  The program benefits the 
primes by promoting advance, pre-tendering identification of SME 
competencies.  The MET Program consists of half-day meetings and 
presentation sessions between SMEs and large firms.   The REX 
Program involves feedback forums, online surveys, and conferences 
for suppliers of specific large signatories and addresses those 
signatories’ specific procurement practices.  Thus, the MET and REX 
Programs are based on the express premise that mere improvements 
in access to information concerning tenders are not sufficient for 
significantly improving subcontracting participation by SMEs.    
The challenges of growth in contract size and of buyer risk 
aversion to purchasing from SMEs are addressed through the 
Passerelle and the SMEwatch Programs.  The Passerelle Program 
enables SMEs to enter into special research, development, testing, 
and evaluation subcontracts where the SME, the large prime 
contractor, and the French State Innovation Agency OSEO (through an 
innovation grant), each finance one third of the SME’s subcontract 
performance.  The French government argues the Passerelle Program 
is a permissible form of a set-aside under E.U. law because 
innovation is not fully funded with procurement funds.  As a result, 
SMEs keep the intellectual property, while the large prime receives 
privileged rights to use the tailored hi-tech product, service, or 
solution developed by the SME in the relevant prime’s business 
domain.   
The SMEwatch program consists of benchmarking of best 
practices among signatories on a wide range of subject areas, 
including motivations of buyers, quality of information exchange, 
subcontractor selection criteria, technological development, risk 
reduction, financing, and the like.  However, these best practices are 
not abstract platitudes.  Rather, best practices are benchmarked 
based on indicators of growing SME share of subcontracts (Jourdain, 
2006, 2007, 2008).       
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Finally, the SME Pact also serves as the mechanism to meet 
targets for SME subcontractor participation in European Framework 
programs for R&D.  “The SME Pact helps to quantify the number of 
SMEs involved in collaborative projects and to know the shape of the 
SMEs in public procurement, which is important in setting targets and 
measuring progress.” (Taylor 2006, p. 31).      
The SME Pact is purportedly a voluntary commitment of 
signatories because it is not mandated by national set-aside laws.  
Further, Comité Richelieu asserts that the SME Pact is a lawful 
voluntary response to set-aside exemptions from the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Government Procurement negotiated by 
the United States, Japan, Korea, and Canada.  However, it seems 
clear that government role in the SME Pact extends far beyond mere 
facilitation of voluntary activities (Jourdain, 2006, 2007, 2008).  For 
example, in 2005, Jacques Chirac, then President of France, directed 
large firms to enter into partnerships with SMEs as part of his 
national R&D policy announcement, Global Competition for 
Technological Supremacy: 
 The State has a responsibility to promote an environment 
which is propitious for the development of major industrial 
projects. This implies having clear strategic priorities: a small 
number of substantial stimulating programs—concentrated in 
a small number of key technological areas. It means that 
everyone involved, SMEs and research laboratories, must 
network around major enterprises. It implies a European 
dimension, without which any grand industrial goal would be 
futile. . . . I’d also like to convey a special message here to the 
leaders of the top French companies. . . Today, you must 
enter into a new partnership for progress with our nation. . . 
.[T]here’s a need to bring in the small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which, alongside you, are making an essential 
and increasingly essential contribution to growth and 
innovation. It is up to you to involve them more closely in your 
research efforts and enter into strategic joint ventures with 
them (Chirac, 2005). 
 French President Chirac’s successor, President Nicholas Sarkozy 
stated that he will “ask the services of the State to examine with the 
greatest attention” (Jourdain, 2008) the information on relations 
between large business signatories to the SME Pact and small 
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innovative firms.  As of 2008, SME Pact signatories, in addition to 
Comité Richelieu and the French State Innovation Agency OSEO, 
included such companies, government-controlled research and 
technology organizations (RTOs), and ministries as: the Ministries of 
Economy and Finance, Ecology and Energy, Homeland Security, and 
Research; the DGA (the General Delegation for Armaments), the 
defense manufacturer and procurement agency; the DCNS, the 
national naval shipbuilding company; the CEA, the atomic energy 
commissariat; the EDF, the national electric utility; the CNES, the 
national space agency; the City of Paris; the RATP, the French 
government-owned autonomous company operating Parisian public 
transport; the SNCF (the French National Railway Corporation); the 
tire maker Michelin; U.S.-owned technology firms with operations in 
France such as Microsoft France, Lexmark, and General Electric (GE); 
and conglomerates with well-known partial ownership by the French 
government, such as aerospace and defense manufacturer Thales 
Group, power generation and transport firm Alstom, and automobile 
maker Renault. This comprehensive level of participation is indicative 
of close government facilitation that goes well beyond mere well-
wishing (Jourdain, 2008).   
To illustrate the SME Pact model’s popularity across Europe, the 
SME Pact European Pilot Action Partnership agreements have already 
been signed by the Norwegian Defense and Security Industries 
Association (FSI), the Torino Wireless Foundation (Fondazione Torino 
Wireless) in Italy, and the Flevoland Development Agency (OMFL) in 
the Netherlands.  In turn, the SME Pact’s Passerelle Program is itself 
based on the Norwegian Industrial R&D Contracts program (IFU/OFU) 
administered by the Norwegian government-owned Innovation 
Norway (IN; 2010) company, which functions as Norway’s trade 
representative agency.  The IFU/OFU scheme is designed to help 
SMEs develop state-of-the-art products for large firms with partial 
financial support from the government. It is funded at €100 million 
per year, with up to €850,000 available per IFU/OFU contract.  Large 
foreign companies operating in Norway are particularly encouraged to 
use the IFU/OFU program (IN, 2010).   
Other SME Subcontracting Measures  
European Union member states have not limited themselves to 
the SME Pact’s quasi-voluntary model when it comes to SME 
subcontracting, but have moved to adopt binding laws and 
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regulations.  Although the European Commission continues to 
emphasize process-oriented subcontracting assistance, it endorsed 
binding subcontracting metrics in the 2008 European Code of Best 
Practices facilitating Access of SMEs to Public Contracts (EC, 2008).  
Specifically, the Code cited with approval U.K. subcontracting 
practices, including publishing of subcontracting opportunities and 
requirements of major prime contractors “to demonstrate their track 
record in achieving value for money through the effective use of their 
supply chain, including how SMEs can gain access to their 
subcontracting opportunities” (EC, 2008, p. 10).  
In non-R&D procurements, the French government imposed 
mandatory subcontracting requirements under the Plan d’Acquisition 
initiative.  However, similar to the SME Pact, this initiative provided 
for financial bonus payments (as well as reductions in delay-driven 
liquidated damages) to large firms, which fulfilled mandatory SME 
subcontracting requirements (Europe Economics, 2009b, p. 90).   
Last year, the EC gave its strongest endorsement yet to 
mandatory set-asides in subcontracting in Article 21(4) of the 
2009/81/EC Defense Procurement Directive (EP & EC, 2009), which 
states  
Member States may provide that the contracting 
authority/entity may ask or be required to ask the successful 
tenderer to subcontract to third parties a share of the 
contract.  The contracting authority/entity that imposes such 
subcontracting shall express this minimal percentage in the 
form of a range of values, comprising a minimum and a 
maximum percentage.  The maximum percent may not 
exceed 30% of the value of the contract.  Such a range shall 
be proportionate to the object and the value of the contract, 
and the nature of the industry sector involved, including the 
level of competition in that market and the relevant technical 
capabilities of the industrial base.  (EP & EC, 2009) 
Recital 3 and Article 73 indicate that this directive is designed to 
promote SME participation in the industrial base.  Further, Article 20 
approves the use of subcontracting, including subcontracting driven 
by social consideration, as a condition of contract performance (EC, 
2009). The Defense Procurement Directive’s language authorizing 
mandatory SME subcontracting obligations appears to be the means 
for ensuring “meaningful” participation of E.U. member states with 
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large concentrations of SME defense firms without reliance on the 
principle of juste retour, or fair return (Georgopolous, 2006). Since 
subcontracting provisions in the 2004 Public Procurement Directive 
(EP & EC, 2004) are much less definitive, the practices spelled out in 
the 2009 Defense Procurement Directive (EP & EC, 2009) would 
likely also be followed in civilian procurements.   
The Defense Procurement Directive’s provision for 30% 
mandatory subcontracting is intended to be a substitute for national 
requirements (a.k.a. offsets) on large international defense 
contractors to subcontract to national suppliers, especially to national 
SMEs, with an E.U.-wide subcontracting requirement favoring all 
European SMEs.  These requirements to subcontract to national 
suppliers, typically SMEs, are called offsets (and other forms of 
industrial collaboration or countertrade).  From the U.S. perspective, 
the Arms Export Control Act (2012, 22 U.S.C. § 2776(e)(1)) defines 
offsets as “an agreement between a U.S. supplier of defense articles 
or services and a foreign country under which the supplier agrees to 
purchase goods and services of the foreign country in consideration 
for the country’s purchase of the supplier’s defense articles or 
services.”  In essence, the Defense Procurement Directive (EP & EC, 
2009) authorized an E.U.-wide SME offset to be imposed on large 
U.S. defense contractors.  Historically,  
U.S. firms accepted collaboration in various forms because it 
is often the only to sell to Europe . . .  Most countries wish to 
be self-sufficient in defense production as soon as possible.  
To this end, countries (and companies) insist on collaboration 
as soon as possible (often with direct offsets of components) 
in lieu of direct buy.  This is why U.S. firms concede that it is 
basically unrealistic to expect . . . the European nations to buy 
finished systems (“Global Arms,” 1991/92, p. 58).   
European suppliers of weapons systems components, just like 
their American counterparts, are typically SMEs (Nackman, 2011, p. 
512; Europe Economics, 2009b, p. 50).  The 2009 Europe Economics 
study on competitiveness of defense-related SMEs prepared for the 
European Commission confirmed that European offset policies 
benefit domestic SMEs. For example, the Netherlands uses 
mandatory offsets to achieve 20 percent SME involvement in 
government contracts (Europe Economics, 2009b, p. 48).           
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Another European subcontracting accountability measure is the 
use of SMEs as award criteria, which incentivizes large prime 
contractors to ensure definitive subcontracting commitments to 
SMEs.  Section 1.4 of the EC’s European Code of Best Practices 
Facilitating Access of SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts (EC, 
2008, p. 10) states that “contracting authorities are encouraged to 
ask their main suppliers to demonstrate their track record in 
achieving value for money through the effective use of their supply 
chain, including how SMEs can gain access to their subcontracting 
opportunities.” The EC Code also emphasizes national practices, such 
as publication of subcontracting opportunities and legal measures to 
discourage subcontracting terms that are less favorable than the 
prime contractor’s terms with the government.  Similar guidance is 
given in the European Defense Agency’s Code of Best Practices in the 
Supply Chain (COBPSC) (EDA, 2006). The EDA further recognizes 
subcontracting offsets as one of the best value award selection 
criteria (EDA, 2005). Thus, large prime contractors operating in 
European civilian and defense procurement markets are generally 
held accountable not only for providing the subcontracting 
opportunities, but also for entering into meaningful subcontracting 
commitments. 
Quantitative Evidence Concerning European SME Subcontracting  
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive data on subcontract 
awards to European SMEs.  This is because the size of the European 
subcontracting market for SMEs in public procurement (whether 
civilian or defense) is not known, although subcontractor e-tracking 
initiatives are in the works (GHK & Technopolis, 2011, p. 47; Sandler, 
2008, p. 410).  However, available fragmentary data from European 
R&D procurement initiatives and international defense trade 
procurements nonetheless suggest that the European approach is 
proving highly effective at requiring large prime contractors to 
dedicate substantial portions of their budgets to buys from European 
SMEs.     
In the area of mandatory SME R&D subcontracts, the leading 
successful example is the French SME Pact.  As noted previously, the 
objective of the SME Pact is to “reinforce relations between 
innovative SMEs and large companies and/or organizations, through 
commercial contracts or R&D collaboration” (EC 2011).  During its 
first two years of existence, 2005–2007, 30 large enterprises 
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entered into SME Pact agreements with 1200 SMEs.  By July 2008, 
participation increased to 2378 SMEs and 47 large entities.  Total 
awards to SMEs grew from €3.3 billion in 2006 to €7.2 billion; €4.6 
billion of this award money went to SMEs that signed the SME Pact in 
2006, and €2.6 billion went to SMEs that signed the SME Pact in 
2007.  The 2006 SME signatories’ total share in large firm 
signatories’ procurements went up from 18.7% to 19.4%, even 
though the total value of large firms’ procurements went up by €5.8 
billion or about one third (Jourdain, 2008).     
Another fragmentary piece of evidence concerning the success of 
the European mandatory SME subcontracting model is found in the 
area of international defense contracting offsets.  According to the 
U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce mandatory subcontracting offsets can effectively redirect 
U.S. defense contractors into long-term supplier relationships with 
European SMEs (BIS, 2011).  BIS data shows that from 1993–2009, 
U.S. defense contractors selling to Europe entered into 2,395 offset 
subcontracts, valued at $11.4 billion (BIS, 2011, p.3).  The U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO, 2004) reported, based on 2002 
data, that large American defense exporters customarily redirected 
10% of their subcontracts from American to European suppliers due 
to offsets.  Thus, BIS and GAO data support, at least indirectly, the 
positions of Nackman (2011) and Europe Economics (2009b) that 
mandatory offset subcontracts result in a substantial benefit for 
European SMEs that have replaced U.S. small businesses in the 
supply chain of large U.S. defense firms.  
U.S. SME SUBCONTRACTING ASSISTANCE TRENDS 
Early Subcontracting Policies 
The Small Business Act of 1953 embraces two related principles 
to govern the award of federal contracts and subcontracts (Small 
Business Act, 2010). These policy principles emphasize the need for 
fairness to small contractors, both from the standpoint of acquisition 
planning, strategies and process, as well as from the standpoint of 
measurable outcomes and results.  The first such principle is 
“maximum practicable opportunity” to participate in federal contracts 
and subcontracts:  
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It is the policy of the United States that small business 
concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by 
veterans, small business concerns owned and controlled by 
service-disabled veterans, qualified HUBZone small business 
concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by 
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and 
small business concerns owned and controlled by women, 
shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate 
in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency, 
including contracts and subcontracts for subsystems, 
assemblies, components, and related services for major 
systems (Small Business Act, 2010, 15 U.S.C. §637(d)(1)).  
The second such principle is “fair proportion,” which is set forth 
as follows: “It is the declared policy of the Congress that the 
Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is 
possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to 
preserve free competitive enterprise, [and] to insure that a fair 
proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for 
property and services for the Government (including but not limited to 
contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) 
be placed with small-business enterprises. . .” (Small Business Act, 
2010, 15 U.S.C. §631(a)).  
Under the Small Business Act (2010) and the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR, 2010), the “maximum practicable opportunities” 
and the “fair proportion” principles are generally blended.  For 
instance, Section 8 of the Small Business Act (2010, 15 U.S.C. 
§637(d)(1)) directs the prime contractors to “establish procedures to 
ensure the timely payment of amounts due pursuant to the terms of 
their subcontracts with small business concerns.”  This section of the 
Small Business Act subjects most large prime contractors to a legally 
prescribed contract clause promising small businesses maximum 
practicable opportunity for participation in subcontracts.  Only 
contracts entirely performed outside the United States, contracts 
below the threshold established for simplified acquisition procedures 
(generally, $150,000 as adjusted for inflation), or contracts for 
personal services are exempt from this requirement   (Small Business 
Act, 2010).  
Further, Section 8 authorizes agencies to offer large firms 
incentives for subcontracting to small firms (Small Business Act, 
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2010).   FAR (2010) Section 19.708 also authorizes agencies to 
provide incentive fees and use small business subcontracting as 
award evaluation criteria.   Many agencies responded by creating 
formal mentor-protégé programs, which give various incentives (such 
as proposal evaluation credits during competitions or the ability to 
count assistance costs towards subcontracting goals during contract 
performance) to large businesses that help small firms build capacity  
(Hordell, 2005).  Some agencies, such as the Departments of 
Defense and Energy, received additional legislative authority to 
financially reimburse large primes that provide subcontracting 
assistance to protégé firms (U.S. GAO, 2011). Section 9 also 
authorizes incentives for subcontracts to small hi-tech firms as part of 
the Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research 
Commercialization Pilot Program (SBIR CPP), later renamed the 
Commercialization Readiness Program (SBIR CRP). (Small Business 
Act, 2010)   
Section 8 of the Small Business Act (2010), as implemented by 
FAR Subpart 19.7 (2010), generally requires companies that receive 
federal contracts over $500,000 (now $650,000) for products or 
services and over $1 million (now $1.5 million) for construction to 
prepare small business subcontracting plans.  These plans are to be 
based on market research and are to contain agreed-upon goals for 
the participation of various small business categories.  Since 1978, 
Section 8 further provides that companies that do not conclude such 
plans within the time required by the agency will be denied the 
contract.  The goals for small business participation set forth in these 
subcontracting plans, however, are not legally binding under Section 
8.  The reason is that the Section 8 legal regime penalizes only those 
prime contractors that fail to comply with the plan requirements in 
“good faith.”  As long as a prime contractor can demonstrate that it 
conducted outreach to potential small business subcontractors, non-
compliance will be excused under this “good faith” standard.  In 
theory, the penalty for non-compliance includes liquidated damages, 
but they are practically never assessed (Small Business Act, 2010). In 
the U.S. procurement system, small business subcontracting plans 
are required, at the very least, of the apparently successful offerors, 
but may also be required of all offerors during the proposal evaluation 
phase.   Small business subcontracting plans pertain to the offeror’s 
responsibility, even if the solicitation requires the offerors to submit 
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such plans with their proposals (Consolidated Engineering Services v. 
United States, 2005).   
The SBA has traditionally assigned a 40% government-wide small 
business subcontracting goal, and goals were further negotiated for 
individual agencies on an annual basis and for individual contractors 
on a per-contract basis (GAO, 2005).  As part of the Comprehensive 
Subcontracting Test Program (CSTP), some defense contractors were 
assigned goals across all contracts (GAO, 2004). 
Recent Subcontracting Policy Measures 
Subcontracting policy in the United States continues to move 
towards greater accountability.  In a 2005 report, Department of 
Energy: Improved Oversight Could Better Ensure Opportunities for 
Small Business Subcontracting (GAO-05-459), the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that agencies should 
evaluate small business subcontracting based on a percentage of 
total contract value in order to promote integrity, accountability, and 
meaningful participation.  This method enables federal agencies to 
impose mandatory subcontracting obligations on large businesses 
and to prevent “misleading” reports by large contractors to 
government agencies (GAO, 2005).   
Individual federal agencies continued to undertake administrative 
measures to ensure that large firms’ small business subcontracting 
obligations under “good faith” subcontracting plans begin to 
approximate hard-dollar commitments.  One such measure involves 
renewed emphasis on on-site reviews of large firms’ compliance with 
small business subcontracting plans by SBA Commercial Market 
Representatives (CMR).  This change is the result of the SBA 
Inspector General’s report, Review of SBA’s Subcontracting 
Assistance Program (Small Business Administration, Office Inspector 
General [SBA OIG], 2007). Section 125.3 of the Small Business 
Administration Regulations (SBA Regs; 2010) defines Commercial 
Market Representatives as SBA’s subcontracting specialists 
responsible for the following:  
(1) Facilitating the matching of large prime contractors with 
small business concerns; (2) Counseling large prime 
contractors on their responsibilities to maximize 
subcontracting opportunities for small business concerns; (3) 
Instructing large prime contractors on identifying small 
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business concerns by means of the CCR [Central Contractor 
Registration electronic database of Federal contractors], SUB-
Net [SBA database of subcontracting opportunities], Business 
Matchmaking events, and other resources and tools; (4) 
Counseling small business concerns on how to market 
themselves to large prime contractors; (5) Maintaining a 
portfolio of large prime contractors and conducting 
Subcontracting Orientation and Assistance Reviews (SOARs).  
The SOARs are conducted for the purpose of assisting prime 
contractors in understanding and complying with their small 
business subcontracting responsibilities, including developing 
subcontracting goals that reflect maximum practicable 
opportunity for small business; maintaining acceptable books 
and records; and periodically submitting reports to the 
Federal government; and (6) Conducting periodic reviews, 
including compliance reviews .   
According to the SBA Inspector General’s Review of SBA’s 
Subcontracting Program (SBA OIG, 2007), CMRs perform several 
types of reviews, including on-site plan compliance reviews, on-site 
follow-on reviews, offsite plan compliance reviews, and desk audits.  
The on-site reviews are considered the most effective, because they 
involve surveillance of large firms implementing their subcontracting 
plans.  The SBA IG found that the SBA reduced the number of on-site 
reviews from a high of 484 in 1995 to a low of 235 between in 2006, 
and that the SBA’s on-site reviews in 2006 constituted only 24% of its 
968 total reviews.  The SBA Inspector General recommended that the 
SBA establish goals for the number of on-site reviews and evaluate 
CMRs based on the achievement of these goals.  As a result, CMRs 
will now be conducting more on-site surveillance reviews, putting 
pressure on large firms to meet or exceed their small business 
subcontracting goals (SBA OIG, 2007).          
The GAO continues to insist that the current percentage of 
subcontracted dollars methodology enables large firms to 
inaccurately convey the appearance of extraordinary subcontracting 
participation levels.  The latest examples of such extraordinary 
subcontracting levels were documented in the GAO report Hurricane 
Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should be More Complete 
Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Business (GAO-07-
205; 2007). The GAO reviewed subcontracting plan compliance by 
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the top four large business Army contractors, which received close to 
$1 billion to work on Hurricane Katrina reconstruction.  The GAO 
(2007) found that these large contractors’ self-reported small 
business subcontracting participation rates were at 88–100% of total 
subcontracted dollars.  The GAO invoked its report GAO-05-459 
(2005) and noted that “as we have previously reported, because a 
contractor could decide to subcontract only a small amount of its 
total federal contract, the portion of subcontracted dollars going to 
small businesses—if reported as a percentage of total subcontracted 
dollars rather than of total contract dollars—could appear to be large” 
(GAO, 2007, p. 18). 
In reality, small business subcontracting amounted to just over 
44% of total Katrina reconstruction dollars awarded to these 
contractors, or from 0.08% to 45% of each contract.  However, 
agency practices in favor of definitive, hard-dollar subcontracting 
requirements are not uniform in the United States.  For instance, 
according to the above-mentioned GAO report number GAO-07-205 
(2007), major contracting agencies, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security and the General Services Administration, allowed 
large contractors to avoid any subcontracting plan documentation on 
70% or more of total funds contracted for Hurricane Katrina 
reconstruction as of March 2006.        
In enacting the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Congress and 
the Executive Branch have moved closer to imposing mandatory 
subcontracting obligations as a matter of national policy.  Since 
2006, the U.S. Senate Small Business Committee has been 
attempting to pass legislation requiring total-dollar measurement of 
subcontracting obligations as recommended in the GAO report GAO-
05-459 (2005).  That legislation also sought to prevent “bait-and-
switch” fraud by requiring large primes to certify that they will use the 
small subcontractors designated in their proposals, unless the 
subcontractors cannot perform.  The Committee’s legislative attempts 
included the Small Business Contracting Revitalization Act of 2010, 
the Small Business Contracting Revitalization Act of 2007, and the 
Small Business Reauthorization and Improvements Act of 2006.  
Among other things, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 requires 
large prime contractors to provide the government with written 
explanations of failure to make a good faith effort to utilize small 
subcontractors in preparing and submitting bids or proposals, as well 
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as of failure to pay small business subcontractors fully or on time 
(Small Business Act, 2010).   In October 2011, the SBA proposed 
implementing regulations not only to require such written 
notifications, but also to require contracting officers to be responsible 
for reviewing large firms’ subcontracting plans (Small Business 
Subcontracting, 2011). 
Ad Hoc Measures 
Moreover, a wide range of stronger ad hoc accountability 
measures can be readily gleaned from legal precedents addressing 
procurements in particular agencies.  In Femme Comp, Inc. v. United 
States (2008), the U.S. Court of Federal Claims described a strategy 
of the U.S. Army Contracting Agency to establish a mandatory “floor” 
of minimum small business participation as part of indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity contracts awarded to large businesses.  
The procurement at issue concerned information technology services.  
Contract performance metrics mandated compliance at least 95% of 
the time with small business subcontracting goals.   
[F]or the Small Business Participation factor, the Army would 
assess “the Offeror’s approach to meeting or exceeding the 
Government’s minimum mandatory requirement for overall 
Small Business participation and the non-mandatory 
objectives” . . . . The Army indicated that it would consider 
“[t]he amount by which the proposed percentage exceeds the 
overall small business category percentage and the amount 
by which the proposed percentages exceed the small 
business subcategory percentages” . . . . The Army would also 
assess (1) “the extent to which [small businesses] are 
specifically identified in the proposals;” (2) “the extent of 
commitment to use [small businesses]”; (3) “the extent of 
participation of [small businesses] in terms of the value of the 
total acquisition”; and (4) for the large business offerors, 
small business participation goals for fiscal year 2006 for the 
[Department of Defense] DoD and other federal government 
agencies, as well as the “actual goals achieved” (Femme 
Comp, Inc. v. United States, 2008)  
In Granite Construction Co., the GAO (2009b) held that the 
Department of the Navy may scrutinize proposed small 
business subcontracting plans with three evaluations.   In that 
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case, the RFP clearly indicates that the agency would 
evaluate an offeror’s small business subcontracting plan as 
part of the non-price evaluation and would then evaluate 
further only those proposals rated acceptable under each 
non-price factor.  . . . [T]he agency would again review and 
approve the subcontracting plan of the technically acceptable 
offeror whose proposal was deemed the lowest-priced (GAO 
2009b, p. 5).  
Although the required subcontracting plan was based on a 
percentage of total planned subcontracted dollars, the agency and 
GAO both refused to allow the large business offeror to artificially 
inflate the small business subcontracting percentages by excluding a 
major large electrical subcontractor (GAO, 2009b).  This refusal is 
consistent with GAO (2005) recommendations in report number GAO-
05-459.  In ITT Corp. (GAO, 2009c), the Department of the Navy 
required offerors to provide “identification of specific small business 
participation in contract performance and the percentage of 
estimated total acquisition dollar value to be performed by such 
businesses” (GAO, 2009c, p. 15). The GAO approved the Navy’s use 
of the total contract dollars subcontracting evaluation factor as part 
of the best value determination.  However, the GAO allowed the Navy 
to choose an “offeror” that had lower small business subcontracting 
participation at the first tier, but proposed higher total small business 
participation when second-tier subcontractors were included.  The 
small business subcontracting plan was evaluated both on a best 
value comparative basis and a pass-fail basis (GAO, 2009c).   
In Navistar Defense, LLC (GAO, 2009d, p. 4), the Army evaluated 
proposed small business subcontracting “on an evaluation scheme of 
excellent/very low risk, good/low risk, adequate/moderate risk, 
marginal/high risk, [and] poor/very high risk.”  Separately, 
subcontractors’ written commitments were evaluated as part of 
evaluations of technical subfactors.  However, the Army chose an 
offeror that proposed “little subcontracting” because that approach 
resulted in a lower price (GAO, 2009d). In Coastal International 
Security, Inc. (GAO, 2009a), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) utilized an offeror’s actual historic record of 
meeting small business subcontracting goals as an award 
discriminator.  This was a separate evaluation method, in addition to 
evaluation of the offeror’s proposals in accordance with the 
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solicitation.  The GAO approved the use of small business 
subcontracting goal achievements as an award discriminator (GAO, 
2009a).        
Finally, in Nova Builders (GAO, 2010), the GAO described how the 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employed a strategy of 
requiring large business offerors to identify small business 
subcontracting targets as a percentage of contract value.  The 
procurement at issue concerned preconstruction and optional 
construction services.  The award was to be made on a best value 
basis, including two evaluations by the government: a trade-off 
evaluation between technical factors and price, and a comparative 
evaluation of competing offerors.  The small business participation 
factor was included as one of technical factors to be evaluated  
based on the following subfactors listed in “decreasing” order 
of importance: (1) the extent the offeror included small 
businesses through a teaming arrangement, (2) the degree to 
which the offeror’s proposed subcontracting plan “exceeds” 
the goals set forth elsewhere in the solicitation, and (3) the 
offeror’s record of meeting or exceeding small business 
performance goals in federal contracts performed in the last 
3 years.  . . . Under this factor, each offeror was required to 
“describe the participation of small businesses in the 
[teaming] arrangement” and “provide a copy of the teaming 
arrangement[’]s executed agreement” in its proposal. (GAO, 
2010, pp. 2-3). 
Significantly, large businesses had to commit to hard-dollar 
targets for small business subcontractors, even though the total 
dollar value of work was not specifically set.  The contract at issue in 
this case was a fixed-price incentive (successive targets) award, 
under which the work was split into two contract line item (CLINs) and 
only the work associated with the first CLIN was definitized while the 
second CLIN was simply subject to a $750 million ceiling  (GAO, 
2010).   
This ever-growing list of ad hoc subcontracting accountability 
measures imposed on large firms by procurement and oversight 
agencies, combined with Congressional efforts to promote 
subcontracting accountability through legislation, suggest that prime 
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contractors cannot expect to avoid making meaningful subcontracting 
commitments to small firms.  
Quantitative Evidence Concerning U.S. Small Business 
Subcontracting  
In contrast to European sources, U.S. agencies maintain both 
comprehensive and fragmentary data concerning U.S. small business 
subcontracting.  Data reported by the SBA Goaling Program website 
suggest that small business subcontractors under the “aspirational” 
subcontracting model are struggling to maintain their market share.  
In fact, this struggle became so severe that the SBA quietly 
abandoned its historic 40% small business subcontracting goal and 
lowered it to 35.9 %, triggering legislative effort by the House Small 
Business Committee to restore the historic goal (Graves 2012; GAO 
2005, p.6).  For instance, in 2008, the total small business share of 
subcontract awards was 28.7% or $71.7 billion of $178.6 billion in 
total subcontracts awarded.  In 2009, the SBA subcontracting goal 
was set at 35.9%, and the percentage went up to 31.82%, although 
the SBA did not report total subcontracting dollars for that fiscal year.  
In 2007, subcontracts to small firms amounted to $64.8 billion, or 
35.05% of $184.9 billion in total subcontracts awarded.  In 2006, 
small business subcontracts amounted to $60.7 billion, or 35.9% of 
$169.2 billion in total subcontracts awarded.  In 2005, small 
business subcontracts amounted to $59.5 billion, or 34.8% of $171 
billion in total subcontracts awarded. In 2004, small business 
subcontracts amounted to $49.7 billion, or 35.6% of $139.7 billion in 
total subcontracted dollars (SBA 2010b).  Between 1985 and 2003, 
small business subcontracting market share “hovered between 34 
and 42 percent, with the [Fiscal Year] 2003 figure at 38.2 percent” 
and the 40% mark was cleared for just five years during that period, 
from 1994 through 1999  (Clark, Moutray, & Saade, 2006, p. 2-3).   
On the other hand, the GAO (2011) data show that mentor-
protégé agreements, which facilitate subcontracting opportunities to 
specific small firms and which require accountability to the 
government during the agreements’ duration, have experienced 
tremendous growth.  As of December 2010, 1,120 small firms had 
ongoing mentor-protégé agreements with large prime contractors 
across 13 federal agencies (GAO, 2011). 
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CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTORS AND FOR PROCUREMENT REFORMS IN THE U.S. AND THE 
E.U. 
Over the last three decades, the U.S. and European procurement 
systems have experimented with ways to enhance small business 
subcontracts in government procurement.  Independently, both of 
these policy experiments demonstrated that mere transparency of 
projects with subcontracting potential, combined with aspirational 
subcontracting goals, is not sufficient for that purpose.  In other 
words, under the Yukins (2010) model, these measures have failed 
to produce greater alignment between the business decisions of large 
primes and the governments’ interest in SME subcontracting.  
Instead, authorities in both systems independently settled on 
requiring accountability for meaningful, definitive, monetized 
subcontracting commitments.  These accountability measures 
include a mandatory spending minimum, a mix of penalties (bonding 
of interests) and monitoring to overcome lack of will or bait-and-
switch tactics, and various incentives to overcome market 
imperfections, such as excessive risk aversion.  Such measures are 
very popular in hi-tech projects.  Thus, a virtual policy consensus is 
emerging.  However, public authorities must be prepared to carefully 
study, weigh, and control the reasons for, and costs of, any incentives 
to large primes. 
Major government contractors, especially international 
contractors, should adopt supply chain management strategies to 
comply with this accountability consensus in each national market.  
First, instead of relying on last-minute publications of subcontracting 
opportunities, they must commit to cultivating long-term relationships 
with small suppliers, as well as to simplifying processes for bringing 
new small suppliers on their teams.  Second, in terms of make-or-buy 
decisions, they must commit to subcontracting 30–40% of total 
national-market contract value with national small firms.  Prime 
contractors must presume that this type of commitment is already 
required, or will be required in the near future, by national authorities.  
Third, they should tailor their corporate subcontracting programs to 
take advantage of all possible incentives, including SME Pact risk-
reduction funding or mentor-protégé incentives.  Fourth, corporate 
subcontracting programs must involve tracking of small business 
spending in each national market over the life of each contract.  
Finally, corporate subcontracting programs must include not only an 
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off-the-shelf procurement dimension, but also a cooperative R&D 
dimension.  In today’s U.S. and European government procurement 
markets, the cost of operating a viable small business subcontracting 
program is the price of admission and continued participation paid by 
large prime contractors.  The good news is that both large and small 
businesses stand to receive a swift return on this investment in the 
form of increased market share and innovation growth.   
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